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Abstract: Through a comparative analysis of two contested states – Kosovo and the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the paper analyses the impact of internal and/or 
external statehood contestation on the scope of citizenship rights. It does so by introducing 
the concept of liminality in the study of citizenship in contested states. It contends that while 
the negative impact of contested statehood on citizenship rights is inevitable, the degree of 
impediment depends on the nature and level of contestation of statehood, the wider (regional) 
citizenship constellations, and on the ability of contested states to use different strategies to 
overcome sovereignty deficits.  
 





Citizenship, widely understood as a link between a political unit and its members, is one of 
the key concepts in socio-political and legal studies. According to T. H. Marshall’s (1998) 
influential definition, citizenship is about ‘full and equal membership in a political 
community’. However, although it is widely recognised that everyone should be entitled to 
the right of membership in a political community, according to Bauböck (2009), it is not easy 
to determine ‘which communities have a claim to self-government and which individuals 
have a claim to citizenship in a particular self-governing community’ (p. 478). This 
uncertainty particularly applies to contested polities, also known as ‘contested states’, 
‘unrecognised states’, ‘quasi states’ or ‘de facto states’. Such states include Abkhazia, 
Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Palestine, Taiwan, the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Transnistria and Western Sahara. While there exists a 
terminological proliferation in the field and growing attempts to define (Pegg, 2017) as well 
as develop a dataset (Florea, 2014) of such polities, I subscribe to the term ‘contested states’ 
as defined by various scholars (Geldenhuys, 2009; Kyris, 2015). 
These entities exist in limbo for they are de jure part of one country but de facto 
claimed and controlled (partially or entirely) by a different (secessionist) political authority. 
Belonging to a grey zone of international and/or local contestation, they essentially embody 
diminished statehood due to their lack of or limited internal and/or external sovereignty. Yet, 
this does not deter contested states’ elites from establishing institutional fixtures of statehood, 
such as border control, taxation, security apparatuses, representative offices or embassies, an 
education system and frameworks for political rights, social protection and identity 
                                                 
1 This article is based on an earlier working paper, ‘Contested Territories, Liminal Polities, Performative 
Citizenship: a Comparative Analysis’, published in the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) 
Working Paper Series (EUI RSCAS; 2018/13). 
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documents. Such states are united by their main goals, which are generally to maintain their 
de facto independence and to gain international recognition (Caspersen, 2009, p. 48).  
While the phenomenon of contested states has attracted increasing scholarly attention, 
the issue of citizenship in contested states remains under-researched. By taking an 
interdisciplinary approach that draws upon politics, law and sociology, I here investigate the 
link between limited sovereignty and citizenship in contested states. This paper has a two-
fold aim: 1) to measure the impact of internal and/or external statehood contestation on the 
scope of citizenship rights in contested states; and 2) to introduce the concept of liminality in 
the study of citizenship in contested states and demonstrate how contested states represent 
liminal spaces of citizenship, whose subjects are neither full citizens, nor stateless. I argue 
that although statehood contestation and lack of sovereignty have a direct bearing on the 
scope of citizens’ rights, the level of impediment of rights and protection of individuals 
belonging to such atypical entities is determined by the degree of internal/external 
contestation as well as the very functionality of the citizenship regime in place. Likewise, the 
analysis of Kosovo and the TRNC demonstrates the ways in which the negative impact of 
state contestation is mitigated by the contested states’ use of various novel and creative, 
formal or non-formal performative practices, such as closer engagement without recognition, 
as well as digital and public diplomacy campaigns aimed at increasing external presence and 
document recognition.  
The bulk of evidence is gathered from legal documents (constitutions, citizenship 
laws and naturalisation procedures), digital diplomacy materials, on-line media articles, 
reports, a limited number of semi-structured interviews and other relevant secondary sources. 
The use of multiple sources will help triangulate the data collected and provide new empirical 
insights. The ‘documental’ aspect of citizenship – identification cards, passports, visas and 
other authorised ‘proofs’ of our identity – is inherently linked to the actions of state 
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authorities, to mechanisms of control and registration of populations and to state and 
international policies controlling the movement of people. Regulation of movement and 
passports constitutes and conveys the very ‘state-ness of states’ (Torpey, 2000, p. 6), or, as 
Friedman (2017) argues, documents are the evidentiary signs of citizenship, statehood, and 
sovereignty. In order to examine the overall politico-legal context and the wider citizenship 
constellations, the paper focuses both on legislation and the practice of citizenship on the 
ground. 
Although the two case studies are discussed in considerable detail, including the 
generation of new insights based on original research of relevant legal documents and on-line 
media articles, the main contribution of the paper is to provide a conceptual explanation of 
the impact of internal and/or external statehood contestation on the scope of citizenship 
rights. Citizenship in contested states has been largely neglected in the scholarship so far. 
Therefore, this paper is an attempt to address an existing gap in the ever growing literature on 
contested states.  
The selection of the cases of Kosovo and the TRNC is justified by their shared 
geopolitical location (being part of Europe) and a similar history of intense external 
involvement. While both cases witnessed heavy involvement of the European Union, the 
latter’s role in relation to citizenship and state-building in the two cases is significantly 
different. Moreover, the two display different degrees of internal and external state 
contestation thus making the cases more representative of the wider population and 
enhancing findings’ generalisation.  
The paper is divided into two main parts. The first provides a critical overview of 
scholarship on the relationship between (lack) of sovereignty and citizenship in contested 
states and then presents the theoretical framework of the study. The second uses the concept 
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of liminality to examine the impact of lack of internal and/or external sovereignty on 
citizenship rights in Kosovo and the TRNC. 
 
 
Sovereignty and Contested Statehood  
 
State sovereignty – meaning a state’s ability to control its border and assert jurisdictional 
authority within those borders – has become the main determinant of statehood. A widely 
cited definition of sovereignty refers to ‘a normative conception that links authority, territory 
(population, society) and recognition’ (Biersteker & Weber, 1996, p. 3). According to this 
definition, in addition to population, territory and the ‘monopoly of legitimate physical 
violence’ (Weber, 1968, p. 56) within the territory, external recognition of state sovereignty 
is essential for a polity to function. Bull (1977), argues that sovereignty as a key attribute of 
statehood is a right that has to be (1) claimed; (2) recognised; and (3) exercised.  
Typically, scholars distinguish between internal and external sovereignty where the 
former refers to the existence of structured and symbolic attributes of statehood and the latter 
refers to relations with other countries and international organisations. Robert H. Jackson 
(1993) distinguishes between ‘negative sovereignty’ that is upheld by the existing 
international normative framework (typical for Third World countries) and ‘positive 
sovereignty’ that emerged in Europe along with the modern state. Stephen Krasner, on the 
other hand, argues that the term ‘sovereignty’ has been used in four different ways, meaning: 
(1) international legal (mutual recognition); (2) Westphalian (non-interference of external 
actors in a state); (3) domestic (the ability to exercise effective control within a polity); and 
(4) interdependence sovereignty (ability of the authorities to regulate flows of goods and 
people across the borders of their state) (1999, pp. 4-5). From the point of view of 
international law, however, the 1933 Montevideo Convention sets the following 
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qualifications that a state should possess as a person of international law: (1) a permanent 
population; (2) a defined territory; (3) government; and (4) capacity to enter into relations 
with the other states (article 1).  
In reality, as Kurtulus points out (2005), one of the most controversial aspects of 
sovereignty is related to the question of whether the concept refers to an absolute (and thus 
qualitative) feature that a territorial entity may or may not have, or whether it refers to a 
limited (and hence a quantitative) property that an entity may possess in varying degrees (p. 
66). Sovereignty is absolute only if one takes full international recognition (normally 
manifested in the form of UN membership) as the sole criterion of evaluation. Otherwise, 
both internationally recognised states and contested states display different degrees of 
internal and/or external sovereignty, or ‘negative’ and/or ‘positive’ sovereignty. Only by 
considering both aspects of sovereignty can one begin to form a better picture of a given 
polity and be able to identify degrees of sovereignty and levels of contestation.  
Thus, I treat sovereignty not as an absolute attribute but as a matter of degree. This is 
particularly obvious in the case of contested states that differ in terms of the degree or 
internal and external sovereignty.   
 
 (Lack of) Sovereignty and Citizenship 
 
As mentioned above, there is a growing literature that examines various key aspects of 
contested polities ranging from the nature and level of contestation (Berg & Kuusk, 2010; 
Geldenhuys, 2009; Caspersen & Stansfield, 2011; Florea, 2014), via international 
engagement (Caspersen, 2009; Lynch, 2004; Pegg and Berg, 2016) to democratisation and 
legitimacy (Caspersen, 2011). A growing number of studies concern the intricacies of dealing 
with these entities in the absence of recognised sovereignty or ‘engagement without 
recognition’ (Cooley & Mitchell, 2010; Ker-Lindsay, 2015; Kyris, 2018; Berg & Pegg 2018; 
 
 7 
Ker-Lindsay & Berg, 2018) as well as on Europeanisation (Kyris, 2015; Bouris & Kyris 
2017). The focus of these works has been on varying degrees of interaction and hybrid 
diplomacy with contested states, by both sovereign states and international organisations, 
without regarding them as independent actors.  
However, the issue of citizenship has been largely neglected. Artman (2013) and 
Popescu (2006) have touched upon the question but their analysis is limited to Russia’s 
policy of distributing passports to the residents of contested states in its neighbourhood. 
Likewise, Berg and Kuusk (2010, p. 46) mention citizenship policy as a feature only for more 
established contested states and problems related to the partial international recognition of 
documents, but do not engage with it further. More recently, Friedman (2017) has been 
analysing the emergence of a distinct border-crossing regime between China and Taiwan. Her 
work demonstrates how exceptional and unusual documentation and travel regimes used in 
such cases may advance efforts to produce sovereign legitimacy in the face of categorical 
ambiguity, but may also undermine the very armature of citizenship and sovereign 
recognition used to contain and manage cross-border mobility. 
A rare instance of examining citizenship in contested states is Grossman’s (2001) 
study, which looks at the relationship between recognition of nationality and recognition of 
sovereignty. Using different individual cases from contested states and other territories and 
dependencies, it suggests that ‘lack of sovereignty in or recognition of a particular territory 
will impede some, but not all, rights and obligations of individuals belonging to it’ (p. 871). 
However, the study does not inquire into citizenship regimes of individual polities. In fact, in 
most cases, citizenship status and rights of individuals in territories and polities that are 
denied international recognition are dealt with in legal studies on statelessness and ‘sans 
papiers’. Nevertheless, I take the view that citizenship is a much broader concept and can’t be 
reduced to documentation and legal status of nationality. 
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Elizabeth F. Cohen (2009) introduced the concept of ‘semi-citizenship’ as a means of 
advancing debates about individuals who hold some but not all rights of full democratic 
citizenship, for example, refugees, documented and undocumented migrants, or some 
minorities. Expanding on Cohen’s concept, Kingston (2014) contends that membership in a 
political entity exists along a spectrum and requires not only the granting of formal 
citizenship, but also attention to the functionality of that relationship. In other words, similar 
to the issue of sovereignty, political membership is not absolute – one either is a citizen, or 
one is stateless – but, rather, is a matter of degree and functionality.  
Citizenship as a key organising principle of modern political life is, above all, a status 
that creates a legal bond between individuals and a polity/state and endows these actors with 
certain rights and obligations. Citizenship is a multidimensional concept encompassing status 
(membership in a political entity), rights (individual or group-differentiated rights) and 
identity (Joppke, 2007). However, despite the promise of equality between members of a 
polity, citizenship is essentially exclusive, differentiated and ‘uneven’ (Krasniqi and 
Stjepanović, 2015). As regards exclusion, both citizenship and the nation-state are 
characterised by a dual capacity to include and exclude.  
The concept of liminality is particularly useful in understanding the specific context 
of citizenship in contested states but also their very actorness in international relations. 
According to Turner, ‘Liminal entities are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and 
between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremony’ 
(1969, p. 95). I argue in favour of using liminality to analyse citizenship as well as 
international engagement of contested states.  They are neither fully-fledged states, 
recognised universally, nor functioning parts of a respective sovereign state (parent state). 
Equally, individuals in contested states are neither citizens, nor are they stateless. Depending 
on the nature of the particular polity, citizens of contested states mostly find themselves in a 
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position of legal indeterminacy and ambiguity that nevertheless may last indefinitely. In this, 
they are similar to Turner’s definition of liminality as a temporary state between the stages of 
separation and re-assimilation. Liminality is particularly useful in analysing citizenship in 
contested states, often seen as a half-way state to full sovereignty and recognition or re-
integration within the parent state, are stranded in a state of in-betweenness, which becomes 
part of the everyday. More often than not, citizens of these liminal zones of citizenship are 
‘invisible’ when it comes to international law.  
 
Liminality and Citizenship in Contested States 
 
The concept of liminality has already been applied to a number of categories of citizenship 
including, but not limited to, women (Roy, 2010) and undocumented migrants and refugees 
(Skeiker, 2010; Swerts, 2017). Swerts develops a theory of ‘liminal politics’ that utilises both 
liminality and performance. ‘“Liminal politics” refers to the process whereby precarious 
populations like the undocumented constitute themselves as political subjects by creating, 
using, and appropriating in-between spaces’ (Swerts, 2017, p. 382). Drawing on Rancière 
(2010), Swerts conceives of politics as an aesthetic activity whereby subjects who are 
rendered invisible in the existing distribution of places try to gain visibility by making a place 
for themselves. Both contested states and their citizens strive to gain visibility by challenging 
prevalent international conceptions and definitions of citizenship and statehood. 
Analysing Russia’s policy in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Artman (2013) argues that the 
latter were ‘effectively “spaces of exception,” liminal zones vis-à-vis international law, 
neither part of Russia nor Georgia nor external to them, where Russia assumed direct 
management of the biological lives of populations’ (p. 685). Thus, belonging to a grey area of 
international sovereignty, contested states represent liminal spaces of citizenship.  
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Fiona McConnell (2017) uses liminality as a paradigm for understanding stability and 
change in institutionalised orders and geopolitics; hence, ‘liminal geopolitics’. Her analysis 
shows that despite limitations and drawbacks stemming from their ambiguous legal and 
political status, in-betweenness and ‘out-of-placeness’ offers liminal actors various 
opportunities of international engagement, thus turning them into ‘liminal geopolitical 
actors’. Similarly, Bouris and Fernández-Molina (2018) define contested states as 
‘international liminal actors’ that use hybrid diplomatic practices to engage internationally 
and seek recognition.  
In addition to liminality, I also use the concept ‘citizenship constellations’ (Bauböck, 
2010) to analyse the wider regional and international context of citizenship rights in contested 
states. As I will show, residents/citizens of these polities more often than not are legally tied 
to more than one polity. The relevant citizenship constellation involves a contested and a 
confirmed state, and in many cases, also an external patron or kin state.  
In what follows I discuss the issue of citizenship in two cases of contested states, 
Kosovo and the TRNC with a focus on the impact of contested statehood and limited 
sovereignty on citizenship rights of their respective citizens.  
 
Kosovo: An ‘Internationally Designed’ Contested State 
 
After 9 years under international administration and suspension of Serbia’s sovereignty, 
Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008 and thus embarked on the path to 
statehood and the creation of a separate citizenship regime under the auspices of the 
European Union. Nonetheless, a decade since its declaration of independence, Kosovo still 
does not possess all statehood attributes, including external and internal sovereignty. This 
mainly stems from the issues related to Kosovo’s contested international status (so far, 115 
members of the United Nations (UN) have recognised its independence), and the refusal of 
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local Serbs to be integrated into the political system of Kosovo. Kosovo thus remains a 
contested polity. 
Kosovo is unique compared to other contested states due to its overwhelming 
international support, especially from the United States (US), the main EU countries and 
other major powers like Japan, Canada, Australia, Turkey and so on. In this respect, Kosovo 
belongs to the category of entities recognised by ‘key great powers’ (Owtram, 2011, p. 129). 
Because of strong international participation during its creation as a state, Kosovo can be 
considered a contested state of ‘international design’ (Bose, 2005, p. 322). Nonetheless, the 
EU’s approach of ‘limited sovereignty – strong control’ applied throughout its presence in 
Kosovo (i.e. the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) and multiple external mechanisms of 
control and supervision have also limited Kosovo’s internal sovereignty (Musaj and Krasniqi, 
2015). 
Internationally, Kosovo has succeeded in becoming a member of the World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as 
well as some regional bodies and international sporting associations (International Olympic 
Committee, International Football Federations etc), but UN (as well as Council of Europe) 
membership is still not in sight. In other words, Kosovo has yet to achieve the ‘gold standard 
of international legitimacy’, which membership in the UN represents in Joshua Keating’s 
(2008) opinion. 
As regards citizenship, shortly after the declaration of independence, the Kosovan 
Assembly adopted a package of basic statehood laws, including the Law on Citizenship (The 
Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, 2008), and started the process of issuing new IDs and 
passports, in this way setting up the contours of an independent citizenship regime, the first in 
the history of Kosovo. The civil register that was created during UN Administration - which 
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included ID cards and special travel documents2 for the residents of Kosovo – laid the 
foundation for an independent Kosovan citizenship regime (Krasniqi, 2012).  
In addition to establishing institutions at home, Kosovo undertook steps to increase its 
presence internationally and provide consular services to its citizens abroad. Despite multiple 
challenges, during its first decade as an independent state, Kosovo has established diplomatic 
relations with over 80 states, opened 25 embassies, and became a member of over 60 
international and regional organisations (Krasniqi, 2014; Visoka, 2018, p. 4). Kosovo’s 
contested statehood has also impacted Kosovo’s relations with the EU, where 5 of the 
member states don’t recognise Kosovo. Yet, Kosovo has managed to build close ties with EU 
institutions as demonstrated by the launching of a visa liberalisation dialogue3 in 2012 and 
signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in 2015. Despite the issue of status 
and EU’s ‘status neutral’ position, the SAA provides an opportunity for Kosovo to maximize 
the benefit of the current situation, fulfil as many criteria as possible and try to consolidate its 
position within the joint market while working with individual states that don’t recognise its 
independence.4  
Lacking universal recognition and full access in multilateral organisations, 
Kosovo was forced to use liminal spaces to perform its diplomatic agency and build informal 
diplomatic networks to bypass formalities and bureaucratic impediments posed by an 
inhospitable international order (Newman & Visoka, 2016). Moreover, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs has pooled resources with foreign embassies in Kosovo, civil society and 
citizens to launch a digital platform - Digital Kosovo - to help integrate Kosovo into the 
                                                 
2 In 2000, the UN Mission in Kosovo issued travel documents for local residents, which neither confer 
nationality (i.e. citizenship) upon its holder, nor do they affect in any way the holder’s nationality. In practical 
terms, the UNMIK Travel Document was a poor substitute for a state passport because only 37 countries 
officially recognised it, thus creating travel-related obstacles for its holders (Krasniqi, 2015, p. 9). 
3 Visa liberalisation was the key priority for Kosovo institutions both because it is not connected to the issue of 
statehood (Taiwanese passport holders have been granted visa free travel within the Schengen area despite of 
the fact that the EU does not recognise Taiwan as a state) and ultimately strengthens Kosovo’s nascent 
citizenship regime (Interview with a Kosovan diplomat, Brussels, 24 June 2017).    
4 Interview with a Kosovan official, Pristina, 11 April 2017. 
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digital landscape. Campaigners approached many institutions (from airlines to social media) 
requesting they include Kosovo or fix Kosovo’s presence on their websites. This is a clear 
instance of individual and institutional agency to challenge statehood contestation. 
Likewise, Kosovo has utilised the ‘soft power’ of representative sport to create 
symbolic pressure on states that have not yet recognised Kosovo thus entering the 
international club of states through the ‘sports door’ (Brentin & Tregoures, 2016). As a result, 
Kosovo participated for the first time in the 2016 Olympic summer games, with Majlinda 
Kelmendi making history by claiming the gold in women’s judo and becoming the first 
Kosovo athlete to ever win a medal in the Olympics. International affirmation through sport 
is altogether very important for Kosovo as a contested state.  
 
Citizenship Rights, Documents and Travel 
 
Kosovo’s claimed right to statehood has been increasingly recognised by more states each 
year and the overwhelming majority (more than 185 out of 193 members of the UN) of states 
recognise its passport de facto or de jure.5 The countries that refuse to recognise Kosovo 
passports include Serbia (although Kosovans can enter Serbia with Kosovo ID cards), 
Russia6, India, Cuba and Seychelles. Spain does not recognise it formally, but allows 
Kosovan Passport holders with valid Schengen visas to enter its territory. Internally, Kosovo 
has made significant steps towards integrating Kosovo Serbs within the Kosovan system 
thanks to the EU mediated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. 
Citizenship has been a crucial instrument for state building in Kosovo both in terms of 
acting as a state but also in terms of integrating minorities into the political system and state. 
                                                 
5 Kosovo Embassy in Vienna, personal communication, 7 December 2017. 
6 Russia allows people with Kosovo passports to enter its territory only in special cases and in order to 
participate in international sporting events (Tanjug, 2015).   
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Kosovo’s citizenship legislation stands out for its territorially inclusive character, civic 
definition of the concept and toleration of dual citizenship (Krasniqi, 2012). However, partial 
international contestation has an impact on citizenship rights of its citizens both domestically 
and internationally. As Grossman argues,  
[s]tate non-recognition adds anomaly, challenging ordinary rules. It gives 
rise to the irony of liberalized nationality rights under domestic law in many 
States coupled with denial of at least some of those rights to those based 
elsewhere: to the extent that recognition of nationality is dependent upon 
recognition of sovereignty’ (2001, p. 853).  
In Kosovo’s case, limited sovereignty affects its citizens in three main ways. First, as 
a result of Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo, there is a substantial, albeit formal, overlap of 
the Kosovan and Serbian citizenship regimes. While de jure the absolute majority of 
residents in Kosovo are entitled to Serbian citizenship, in practice this right is limited to the 
Serb minority and other non-Serb minorities in Kosovo. On the other hand, while all the 
Serbs in Kosovo (as well as many Serb and non-Serb refugees who haven’t returned since the 
end of the war) are entitled to Kosovan citizenship, a significant number of them refuse to 
accept it. Kosovo declared independence a decade ago, but its government institutions are not 
the only ones present in the country. At least four different sets of institutions operate in 
Kosovo (Kosovo’s, UNMIK’s, EULEX’s and Serbia’s) creating a highly complex net of 
institutions, legal norms and jurisdictions that often overlap, with Kosovo residents being tied 
to at least two polities (Kosovo and Serbia) and even more political authorities that determine 
their legal rights. 
Second, state contestation limits the level of access to various rights, such as travel, 
but also the right to hold your state accountable at the level of international organisations (for 
example, the European Court of Human Rights). In reality, while it is for each individual 
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state to determine its nationals, it is not unknown for other states to attribute to a person for 
their own purposes a nationality that the state in question itself would deny (Grossman, 2001, 
p. 870). One such instance is the decision of various EU states to treat Kosovo Albanian 
migrants and refugees as Serb citizens (due to the fact that they had been such at the time of 
the arrival), despite Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the fact that these states 
recognise it. 
Third, and most importantly, Kosovo’s citizenship is not very functional due to the 
country’s overall position and potential is limited due to domestic structural limitations and 
factors. Although the country has had almost unreserved support from powerful allies, its 
overall performance hasn’t been very good, especially in terms of internal functioning and 
economic development. Although Kosovo’s economic growth has been steady and has 
outperformed its neighbours, it has not been sufficient to significantly reduce the high rate of 
unemployment, provide more formal jobs, particularly for women and youth, or reverse the 
trend of large-scale outmigration7 and reliance on remittances to fuel domestic consumption. 
In terms of travel, Kosovo passport holders are the only ones in the Western Balkans 
who need a visa to enter the Schengen Area.8 In a larger context, according to the data 
provided by the Passport Index (2018), which ranks countries according to the number of 
countries with which the passport allows visa-free entry9, the Kosovan passport is among the 
20 weakest passports of the world. In this respect, Kosovan citizenship is rather weak and 
dysfunctional. The quality and functionality of citizenship is hindered both as a result of the 
issue of state contestation and internal weaknesses. 
                                                 
7 In addition to outmigration, Kosovo faces a ‘citizens hemorrhage’. Between 2008 and 2017 more than 40,000 
citizens have renounced Kosovan citizenship (Krasniqi-Veseli 2017).  
8 This is expected to change soon as a result of a recommendation by the Commission to European Parliament 
and Council to lift the visa requirements for Kosovo passport holders (Balkan Policy Research Group, 2018).   
9 Since 2011 a new EU mediated travel regime between Kosovo and Serbia has been established that enables 
Kosovo citizens to travel to Serbia using their Kosovo ID cards. Upon arrival in Serbian territory, they must 
receive an entry document (a paper) that allows a stay of up to 90 days. 
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Kosovo’s unresolved status affects Serbia’s citizenship regime, too. Serbia’s 
citizenship regime is differentiated; it distinguishes between three categories of citizens. The 
first one includes legal residents in Serbia proper and who possess regular passports, which 
have been included in the Schengen Area’s visa free regime since 2009. These passports are 
recognised worldwide, including by Kosovo. The second category includes ethnic Serbs 
residing in Kosovo. They are issued passports which are not included in the visa-free regime 
but have been accepted as travel documents around the world. Part of Serbia’s transition onto 
the visa ‘white list’ was the European Commission’s requirement that citizens of Serbia 
residing in Kosovo receive Serbian passports that designate their status as Kosovo residents. 
These passports distinguish Kosovo residents from other Serbian citizens, excluding them 
from the visa-free regime. They are issued by a special Coordination Directorate within 
Serbia’s Ministry of Interior in Belgrade. The ministry issued a total of 97,809 passports 
between 2009 and 2016 (Andric & Bailey, 2017). The third category includes all the 
residents of Kosovo, including Kosovo Albanians, which nominally are Serb citizens but in 
practice are excluded from Serbian citizenship (Vasiljević, 2012).  This shows how state 
contestation and complex legal situations manifest themselves in atypical and highly complex 
citizenship and travel regimes. By the same token, it demonstrates the use by the EU of 
citizenship and free travel as instruments to disentangle Kosovo’s and Serbia’s citizenship 
regimes.  
In sum, Kosovo has made significant progress in strengthening its statehood 
institutions at home and gaining international recognition abroad. Its emerging foreign policy 
and citizenship regime have a dual capacity of serving both as a tool of state-building and as 
a statehood prerogative. Kosovo has pushed hard to establish its citizenship regime at home 
and gain recognition of its statehood abroad and in both endeavours has had significant 
support from great powers. However, the impact of state contestation on citizenship rights 
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and status of its citizens is notable. Moreover, the overall poor functionality of its political 
system and citizenship regime has created numerous impediments for its citizens ranging 
from the quality of rights and protection at home, to travel and status abroad, thus leaving the 
country and its people in a liminal and exceptional situation. 
 
TRNC: The (Un)Recognised EU Territory 
 
Established in 1983, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is one of the oldest contested 
states in existence. The history of the TRNC is intricately related to Cyprus’ colonial past as 
part of the British Empire and the post-1960 political disagreements and communal strife. 
The failure of the bi-communal government in 1963, Greek Junta’s staged coup against the 
Cypriot President Makarios and subsequent Turkish militarily intervention in 1974 resulted in 
a divided island setting the stage for the creation of a Turkish Cypriot-dominated polity in the 
northern part of the island. The Turkish Cypriot leaders first established a ‘Turkish federated 
State of Cyprus’ in 1975 and then 8 years later they declared the independence of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (Bahcheli, 2004, pp. 168-70). Its independence has been 
recognised by Turkey alone.  
As regards international activity, in addition to its diplomatically accredited Embassy 
in Istanbul, the TRNC maintains 19 Representative Offices in Western Europe, Asia and 
North America (MFA TRNC, 2017). With Turkey’s support, the TRNC has managed to gain 
some access to various international fora, namely the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation 
(OIC) and the Economic Cooperation Organisation, where it managed to maintain an 
observer status (Geldenhuys, 2009, p. 180). However, the TRNC not only failed to gain wider 
international recognition but also has been subjected to international isolation and economic 
and travel embargoes imposed on it by the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and supported by many 
European states. Yet, given the fact that it has a stable political and economic system, 
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including a centralised and effective government, public administration, a multi-party 
political system and a working economy and also effective control of the territories they 
claim, TRNC is considered a contested state that displays a high degree of internal 
sovereignty (Bouris & Kyris, 2018, p. 759).  
Although the TRNC has worked to maintain its de facto independence and sought to 
find ways to engage internationally and broaden its international relations and recognition, it 
has nevertheless been actively engaged in various international initiatives to find a solution 
that would unify the island. Despite the fact that a common solution has yet to be reached, 
EU involvement and the dimension of EU membership10 has altered the political and national 
dynamics in the TRNC (Kyris 2015). In particular, the prospect of EU citizenship deriving 
from the potential unified citizenship of a joint bi-national state, has opened new horizons 
and opportunities both for its citizens, civil society and its political leadership (Bouris and 
Kyris, 2018). 
 
Fractured Citizenship in the Island State 
  
Since the establishment of the RoC, the ‘very concept of citizenship was not only 
ethnically/communally defined by the Constitution, but it was also a sharply divisive issue 
between the Greeks and Turks, acquiring strong ethnic and nationalistic overtones’ 
(Trimikliniotis, 2010, p. 390). Indeed, citizenship in the new state was regulated by the 
Treaty of Establishment. Accordingly, any British subject of Cypriot origin ordinarily 
residing on the island at any time in the period of five years immediately before 1960 became 
a citizen of RoC on 15 August 1960. Similarly, the constitution of the TRNC provides for an 
ethno-religious-based nationality and citizenship to a large extent reproducing the provisions 
                                                 
10 When the RoC signed the EU Accession Treaty on 16 April 2003, article 1(1) of the Protocols on Cyprus 
provided that ‘[t]he application of the acquis shall be suspended in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in 
which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control’ (European Union, 2003). 
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of the RoC (Dodd cited in Trimikliniotis, 2010, p. 393). According to article 67 of the TRNC 
constitution, ‘all persons who acquired citizenship of the Republic of Cyprus under Annex D 
of the Treaty of Establishment […] and were ordinarily resident in the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus on the 15th November, 1983[…] shall be citizens of the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus’ (The Constituent Assembly of the TRNC, 1983). The key principles of 
citizenship were reaffirmed in the TRNC Citizenship Law No. 25/1993 (The Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, 1993) adopted in 1993.  
There are three key citizenship related issues in the TRNC. First, TRNC citizenship is 
not recognised beyond Turkey. Although its passports can be used for travel to 5 more 
countries - Australia, France, Pakistan, UK and US, pre-arrival visas are required for 
everywhere apart from Turkey.11 Importantly, the biggest challenge to TRNC citizenship 
comes from the fact that despite the existence of two competing claims of authority on the 
island, Turkish Cypriots still have access to the citizenship of the Republic and thus to 
European Union citizenship (Skoutaris, 2011). The TRNC authorities have undertaken active 
measures to prevent people from the north from crossing the ‘Green Line’ as well as from 
acquiring RoC citizenship. In 1995 a ‘passport scandal’ occurred in the TRNC when it was 
revealed that among many Turkish Cypriots passports of the (Greek-Cypriot controlled) RoC 
were more in demand than the local, unrecognised ones. The TRNC authorities, in turn, 
responded with immediate measures threatening to confiscate RoC passports and even 
sentence people to jail (Isachenko, 2012, 97). However, after the opening of the Green Line 
in 2003, Turkish Cypriots could openly apply for identity cards and passports from the RoC 
as well as cross to the south for other services, including healthcare.  
Between 1995 and 2009, some 101,778 Turkish-Cypriots have acquired birth 
certificates of the RoC, while 83,372 have acquired identity cards and 54,595 passports (the 
                                                 
11 TRNC London Representative Office, personal communication, 12 December 2017. 
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numbers of applications for citizenship more than doubled since Cyprus acceded to the EU 
and there is a backlog of some hundreds of applications pending) (Trimikliniotis, 2010, pp. 
408-9). It is estimated that some 100,000 Turkish Cypriots have acquired RoC passports. In 
many ways, this undermined TRNC citizenship and statehood. Another alternative 
citizenship for TRNC residents is provided by Turkey. TRNC citizens have always enjoyed 
preferential treatment in Turkey. Turkish citizenship legislation provides TRNC citizens with 
all the social and economic rights of Turkish citizens except voting rights; they have an 
option to obtain a Turkish passport without becoming a citizen of Turkey or a fast-track 
process for the citizenship applications of those TRNC citizens who want to acquire the 
citizenship of the Republic of Turkey (Kadirbeyoglu, 2010, p. 16). 
The second issue, and probably the most complex, is that of Turkish settlers in the 
TRNC. Already in 1975, the TRNC authorities launched a ‘settler recruitment program’, 
which facilitated the arrival of settler families from Turkey. Turkish-Cypriot authorities at the 
time argued that these seasonal and low-skilled ‘migrant workers’ were crucial to fill the 
labour shortages and to build a viable economy (Cirakli, 2016, p. 84). According to the 
Turkish-Cypriot ‘Home Office’ data, a total of 21,851 citizenships were offered to Turkish 
nationals as part of the ‘settlement program’ between 1974 and 1981 (Cirakli, 2016, p. 87). 
The number of settlers is still disputed today. According to the Republic’s authorities, there 
are about 115,000 ‘settlers’ north of the Green Line, whereas Turkish Cypriot sources refer to 
a number of less than 90,000 out of a total of 220,000 people (Skoutaris, 2011). The status of 
this group of TRNC citizens in a potentially united country has turned into one of the key 
negotiating issues. The RoC does not consider the ‘settlers’ as legitimate claimants to Cypriot 
citizenship and thus they do not have access to EU citizenship via the citizenship laws of the 
RoC. However, had the Annan Plan been approved by both parties, around 80,000 ‘settlers’ 
(45,000 in the list, 18,000 spouses, and 17,000 naturalised) could have become citizens of the 
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United Cyprus Republic and thus of the EU (Skoutaris, 2011).  
Moreover, within the TRNC, the ongoing immigration from mainland Turkey has 
since converged with the citizenship status of the newcomers to constitute a central crux of 
identity politics in the Turkish-Cypriot community and in turn, has transformed the 
citizenship status of Turkish settlers into a political battleground since the first general 
elections in 1981 (Cirakli, 2016, pp. 84-86). Although under the 1993 TRNC citizenship law 
anyone who has been living in the northern part of the island legally for at least five years is 
entitled to receive citizenship, the five-year requirement is in practice often waived by the 
Interior Ministry or Council of Ministers on grounds that the applicant ‘is of benefit to the 
state’. Articles 8-12 of the law allow acquisition of citizenship by decision of the Council of 
Ministers. The TRNC government has recurrently granted citizenship to Turkish settlers. The 
2002 decision of the then TRNC government (led by the centre-right Democrat Party, DP) to 
grant citizenship to some 1600 people in one sitting caused controversy and later led to 
protests and a ‘citizenship-stripping’ legal battle launched by the social democratic 
Republican Turkish Party, CTP (An, 2004; Cirakli, 2016, p. 137). In particular, the number of 
people acquiring TRNC citizenship through ‘exceptional naturalisation’ tends to soar under 
the centre-right governments and before elections. 
However, a new Permanent Residence Permit Act 51/2015 (TRNC Assembly, 2015) 
was adopted in 2015 that effectively suspended the handing out of further TRNC citizenships 
except for births and marriages, replacing it with permanent residence permits. As a result, 
some 10,000 people, who are already entitled to receive TRNC citizenship, will be receiving 
permanent residence permits or ‘white ID cards’ instead (Aydin 2016). The TRNC authorities 
are under strong pressure, on the one hand, from Turkey and local nationalist parties and 
associations to grant TRNC citizenship to thousands of Turkish ‘settlers’ and, on the other 
hand, from the international community and Greek Cypriots to limit this practice in order not 
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to undermine the peace process (Yeni Duzen, 2016). 
The TRNC has developed explicit provisions for ‘exceptional naturalisation’. 
According to article 9(1)(b) of the citizenship law, ‘Persons who have made investment in 
industrial, trade, tourism, social and economic fields in the Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus and have performed, or are likely to perform, extraordinary services in science, 
politics and cultural sectors’ can acquire TRNC citizenship by decision of the Council of 
Ministers, without requiring the satisfaction of residence criteria. Consecutive TRNC 
governments have exercised their discretionary powers to grant citizenship to foreign 
investors from Turkey as well as other countries (An, 2004; Eroglu, 2017). This is another 
policy with regard to which the TRNC mirrors citizenship provisions and practices of the 
RoC, which is known for its flexible investor citizenship provisions (Džankić, 2015, pp. 8-
10). 
Third, the accession of the RoC to the EU in 2004 has dramatically altered the 
situation on the ground and consequently has weakened the legitimacy of the TRNC 
authority. Unlike in the case of Serbia-Kosovo, where the EU’s role has been instrumental in 
disentangling Kosovo’s citizenship regime from that of Serbia using EU conditionality and 
visa liberalisation mechanisms, in the case of Cyprus, EU citizenship has been utilised as an 
instrument to integrate the two communities and the island’s fractured citizenship. Given the 
fact that the RoC continues to recognise, in accordance with its own rules, the citizenship and 
the right to citizenship of all Cypriot residents of Turkish origin residing in the North who 
can prove that they come under the scope of its legislation, most of the TRNC residents can 
‘activate’ their EU citizenship. However, neither RoC, nor the EU can uphold their 
legislation against the TRNC within the territory under its control. Moreover, whereas the 
added layer of EU citizenship and the subsequent lifting of restrictions of travel between the 
two parts of the island have enabled many residents in the north to claim their RoC 
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citizenship and by implication also their EU citizenship, naturalised TRNC citizens and 
second (or even third) generation Turkish-Cypriots of Turkish origin this still remain in a 
legal limbo when it comes to their citizenship status and rights.  
Contested statehood and limited international recognition put multiple insurmountable 
barriers in TRNC’s relations with the EU. TRNC’s low degree of external sovereignty and 
recognition has however enhanced the role of local technocrats and civil society in managing 
EU affairs. This is an example of ‘how the lack of external sovereignty has mediated the 
process of Europeanisation in the form of changing domestic power distribution towards an 
empowered civil society as an alternative interlocutor with Brussels’ (Bouris & Kyris, 2018, 
p. 761). However, TRNC’s interaction with the EU has been very limited compared to 
Kosovo. Above all, EU accession of RoC, which continues to take an uncompromising stance 
towards any form of external engagement with Turkish Cypriot officials, has limited TRNC 
interaction with the EU to a bare minimum required in the context of ongoing reunification 
efforts (Ker-Lindsay, 2018, p. 6). 
In sum, despite displaying a high degree of internal sovereignty, TRNC’s lack of 
wider international recognition of its statehood and continuous ‘stigmatisation’ (Ker-Lindsay, 
2018) has hindered its citizenship regime recognition. Yet, given the wider citizenship 
constellations that involve TRNC, Turkey, RoC and the EU, citizenship gained enormous 
relevance mainly as a pre-condition for access to the RoC (and therefore EU) citizenship 
and/or that of Turkey. Consequently, while the TRNC remains in international limbo and 
isolation, far from being ‘invisible’ citizens, TRNC citizens, for the most part, have access to 
a number of citizenship options, the most important one being EU citizenship. This adds 
another dimension of liminality with TRNC citizens being caught in a perplexing network of 






 (Lack of) sovereignty and citizenship are inherently linked. In many ways, recognition of 
citizenship is dependent upon recognition of sovereignty. In principle, if citizenship is 
intrinsically connected to the state, then the inexistence of the state means the inexistence of 
citizenship; however, given that sovereignty is not absolute, the result of incomplete or 
limited sovereignty is incomplete and limited regulation of citizenship, but not its total 
absence (Khalil, 2007, p. 39). This link and the impact of lack of sovereignty on the quality 
and functionality of citizenship more generally is hardly anywhere more visible than in the 
case of contested states. Different degrees of internal/external contestation as well as the very 
functionality of a citizenship regime determine the level of impediment of rights and 
protection of individuals belonging to such atypical entities.   
Despite a rapid growth in the recent years, the contested states literature has neglected 
the impact of limited/contested sovereignty on citizenship in contested states. This article has 
addressed this gap in the literature through a comparative discussion that introduces the 
concept of liminality to analyse the link between contested statehood and citizenship. The 
two cases analysed here display different degrees and forms of contestation and, 
consequently, different levels of impediment of their (claimed) citizens’ rights. While 
Kosovo has reached high levels of international engagement and consequently increased the 
value of their citizenship, the TRNC has adopted a more flexible attitude allowing their 
respective citizens to acquire the citizenship of the parent state (the RoC). Since the RoC is 
an EU member, these policies also enabled access to EU citizenship. So, more than its 
citizenship regime’s strength, it is the wider regional context or the relevant citizenship 
constellation involving one or several confirmed states (parent state, external patron or kin 
state) that provides contested states’ residents with access to citizenship of confirmed states, 
including EU member states.     
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Looking at two different types of contested states, this paper has shown that the 
negative impact of the lack of sovereignty and contested statehood on the quality of 
citizenship and individual rights and protections is inevitable. The degree and nature of 
impediment, on the other hand, varies largely and depends on the nature and level of 
contestation of statehood and lack of recognition and, importantly, on the ability of contested 
states to use liminal spaces to perform their diplomatic hybrid practices such as closer 
cooperation with other states or the EU through ‘engagement without recognition’.  
Additionally, an analysis of these contested states’ citizenship regimes demonstrates a 
high degree of similarity, imitation and ‘creative adaptation’ (Taylor, 1999) of citizenship 
norms and practices compared to their respective parent states. More often than not, 
citizenship norms and practices regarding definition or single/dual citizenship policies mirror 
those of their respective parent states. Moreover, in the case of the TRNC, this contested state 
also ‘imitates’ its parent state (the RoC) when it comes to the practice of citizenship by 
investment.  
Looking in detail at Kosovo and TRNC, the paper has demonstrated that in spite of a 
precarious position, general political neglect and exclusion, it would be incorrect to see all 
the individuals claimed by those contested states as homines sacri stranded in a state of 
exception that is becoming the norm and being reduced to a state of bare life (Agamben, 
1998). Without underestimating the plight of millions of other residents of contested states 
who are formally and/or informally stateless, the study highlights the crucial relevance of 
citizenship constellations, and the creative and flexible policies of some of these contested 
states that have ultimately provided their claimed citizens with meaningful status, rights and 
protection.  
By the same token, the paper has shown some of the many ways in which liminality 
manifests itself in terms of citizenship. Due to the ambiguous status and nature of contested 
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states, their citizenship regimes, documentation and travel arrangements are often atypical, 
ambiguous, exceptional and liminal. To paraphrase Friedman (2017, p. 82), these atypical 
documents and evidentiary standards of citizenship both substantiate contested states’ claims 
to sovereign standing and simultaneously undo those very claims through their ambiguity. In 
other words, ‘where there are conflicting claims to sovereignty, there may be anomalous 
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